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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE Q~F UTAH 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation 
Plaintiff .and Res~oondent, 
vs. 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant ~and Appellant. 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC., 
PLaintiff and AppelLant, ~ 
vs. I HARTFORD ACCIDEl'JT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8719 
Case No. 8720 
Case No. 8736 
REPLY BRIEF OF HARTFO·RD ACCIDENT 
& INDEMNITY COMPANY ON APPEAL 
PRELIMINARY STATEl\1:ENT 
Hartford deems it advisable to submit a brief reply 
to the briefs filed on behalf of the respective plaintiffs 
in the above consolidated cases. We shall treat first, the 
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points made by Felt on its appeal, and subsequently th~ 
points raised by the various plaintiffs in response to 
the contentions of the Hartford. In this brief, we shall 
designate the parties in the same manner as followed 
in our original brief, and we shall also refer to the record 
by the same system of designations. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS 
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, 
WHICH IT ASSIGNED T·O WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY 
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S 
COMPLAINT. 
POINT III. 
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S 
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR 
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE 
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR 
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND 
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE 
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIOR BREACHES ON THE 
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID 
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
WAIVE ANY. BREACHES UPON THE PART o·F FELT OR 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL. 
POINT V. 
FELT IS BARRED FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION 
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 16-9-8, U. C. A., t~953. 
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POINT VI. 
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF 
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER. 
POINT VII. 
HARTFORD DID NOT CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE O·BLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL. 
POINT I. 
FELT WAS NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS 
TO THE PORTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, 
WHICH IT ASSIGNED TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN. 
Felt claims, on its appeal, that notwithstanding that 
it had assigned to vVright-vVirthlin 89.6% interest 1n 
its right to receive funds from the miscellaneous account 
under the primary construction contract, (Ex. Pr.-2), 
that it was nonetheless the real party in interest and 
entitled to bring this action. The argument is falsely 
premised. The purpose of the real party in interest stat-
utes was not to protect the interest of the equitable ovvner 
of the chose en action, but to protect the obligor. This 
court recently said in Shaw v. Jeppson, (Ut.), 239 Pae. 
(2d) 745: 
"The reason the defendant has the right to 
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party 
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude 
any action on the same demand by another and 
permit the defendant to assert .all defenses or 
counterclaims available against the real owner of 
the cause." 
Felt refers to ancient common law principles, and 
then argue.s, by analogy to the principles of contracts 
for the benefit of third party beneficiaries, that it is 
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entitled to bring this action, and that it is the real party 
in interest. The analogies upon which it attempts to pro-
ceed are false, and whatever may have been the rules 
in the ancient common law, the rule has been well estab-
lished in this jurisdiction, from the beginning of state-
hood, that the assignee of a chose en action is the real 
party in interest, and the one entitled to bring the suit. 
In Wines vs. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., (Ut.), 33 Pac. 
1042, this court said: 
"So it is held that an assignee is the real 
party in interest, and it is immaterial whether 
or not any consideration was actually paid for 
the assignment, or whether or not the assignment 
was merely made for the purpose of the suit, if it 
was in fact made." (Emphasis ours.) 
In Wilson v. Kiesel, et al., (Ut.), 35 Pac. 488, this 
court said at page 491: 
•'The statute of Utah (2 Comp. Laws 1888, 
# 3169), declares that every action must be prose-
cuted in the name of the real party in interest, 
except certain cases~ "~hich do not in any wise 
affect the question at bar. This language does not 
ad1ni t of doubt .as to its 1neaning. The real party 
in intert~st at the beginning of tlze action must 
JJrosccufc it iu his ou.;n U(une. It is not necessary 
to enlarge upon the reasons for this rule, or to 
ei tP deeisions under it; it is sufficient for us to 
knn"· "~hat the la"· is~ and it is our duty to enforce 
it. 
.. • • • ~\s the no1uinal plaintiff, ''Tilson, had 
no judg1uent or other cause of action against t~e~e 
dt'ft~ndants 1chcn he brought thent -into court, It IS 
quitP apparent that he cannot, in justice complain 
i r hi~ aetion is dis1nissed at his cost, and the as-
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signee cannot complain, because he has never 
sought any judgment against defendants." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
In Anderson vs. Yosen~ite Mining & Milling Co., 
(Ut.), 35 Pac. 502, this court said at page 503: 
"Upon an exa1nination of the record, we find 
that the contention of the .appellant cannot be 
sustained. * * * The fact that plaintiff still re-
tained the note in his possession would not de-
prive the assignee of the right to sue thereon in 
accordance vvith the contract between the parties. 
Having authority to sue, Scott and Remington 
could sue one or all of the makers. The assign-
ment carried with it the note and debt evidenced 
thereby. Scott and Remington [the assignees] 
vvere the real parties in interest and entitled to 
sue." (Emphasis ours.) 
In flational Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. 
Co., (Ut.), 137 Pac. 643, this court said: 
"Comp. Laws 1907, #2902, provides: 'Every 
action must be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest, except that an executor or 
administrator, a trustee of .an express trust, or 
a per_son expressly authorized by statute may sue 
without joining with him the person for whose 
benefit the action is prosecuted. * * *' 
"* * * Mr. Pomeroy, in his excellent work 
on Code Remedies (4th Ed.), #127, in referring 
to the rule that all actions should be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest, says: 
'Not only does the rule prevail when the assign-
ment is .absolute and CO!Jlplete and the assignee 
is the legal owner of the demand; it prevails with 
equal force in cases where the assignment is 
simply equitable in its character; and the as-
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signee's title would not have been recognized in 
any form by a court of law under the old system, 
but would have been purely equitable. Such as-
signee, being the real party in interest, must bring 
the action in his own name.' " (Emphasis ours.) 
In Bank of American Fork v. Smith, (Ut.), 140 Pac. 
122, this court said at page 125: 
"We think that, when the agreement and the 
transactions had under it are considered as a 
whole, what ~Ir. Jensen did in obtaining money 
from the plaintiff at least amounted to an equit-
able assignment of the obligations assumed by, 
as well a.s the rights arising under the agreement 
to the plaintiff. * * * We have recently held that 
under our constitution and statutes the equitable 
assignee of a chose in action is the real party in 
interest, and may sue as such assignee, notwith-
standing that such could not have been done at 
common law." (Emphasis ours.) 
In J!oss v. Taylor, (Ut.), 273 Pac. 515, this court 
~aid at page 520: 
•'The assignee of a cause of action is a real 
party £n interest .and n1ay prosecute an assigned 
cause of action in his own name under the pro-
Yisions of Con1p. La "~s lT tah 1917, #6495~ although 
the assign1nent "~as 1nade "~ithout consideration or 
''"'as 1nade solely for the purpose of bringing an 
artion." (Emphasis ours.) 
'r1H' rule laid do"~n by tl1is line of decisions has 
nPvPr hC'C'n disturht'd, and see1ns no"~ to be so well estab-
li~hf'd thnt there hns been no occasion for this court 
to pn~~ upon it in reeent ~Tears. It follo,vs therefore, that 
I~elt "·ns not tht' real party in interest, at least as to 
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89.6% of the claim, .and the court properly refused to 
allow it any recovery on that portion. 
Felt attempts to derive comfort from the fact that 
'V right-vVirthlin reassigned its rights to Felt by an in-
strument dated December 20, 1956 (Ex. F-35). This was 
the date on which trial of these actions commenced. Felt 
did not have this right at the time it commenced suit, 
or at any time prior to trial. It could not, by a trans-
action occurring after the commencement of suit assert 
or enforce a right \vhich it did not have at the time suit 
was commenced. Wilson v. Kiesel, (Ut.), 35 Pac. 488. 
Moreover, this right had co1npletely lap.sed by virtue 
of the limitation period provided in the bond as follovvs: 
"5. No suit, action, or proceeding by reason 
of .any default, whatever, shall be brought on this 
Bond after tvvo (2) years from the date on which 
the final payment under the contract falls due, 
provided, however, that in the event there exists 
or is pending any collateral litigation which has 
the effect of making it impossible for any Obligee 
under this Bond to determine its rights hereunder, 
a suit, action, or other proceeding under this 
Bond may be instituted within six (6) months 
.after entry of final judgment in said collateral 
litigation." (Ex. Pr.-1) 
The collateral litigation necessary to determine the 
rights of the obligees on the bond terminated October 
5, 1955. (Tit. Co. R. 13). Under the terms of the bond 
above set forth, any action against the Surety on the 
bond was required to be cominenced no later than April 
4, 1956. Wright-Wirthlin brought no action within that 
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time. It could not breath new life into its stale clain1 
by assigning it back to Felt. 
It should be noted here, that the Hartford interposed 
the a.ssignment as a complete defense, since it was ~ 
clear violation on the part of Felt of the primary con-
struction contract (Ex. Pr-2, ,-r-15). The court did not 
treat it as a complete defense, but rather as a partial 
defense. The error, if any, was in Felt's favor, and it 
has no grounds upon which to complain. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENSE OF ASSIGNMENT WAS PROPERLY 
RAISED BY THE HARTFORD IN ITS ANSWER TO FELT'S 
COMPLAINT. 
Felt apparently in desperation, seeks to take refuge 
in technical rules of pleading, and asserts that the Hart-
ford~s defen.se of assignment "\Yas not properly or timely 
rai~ed. ,,~ e invite the court's attention to paragraph ·1 
of the fourth defense in our answer to Felfs complaint 
(Felt R. :27), ,,-herein the Hartford specifically alleged 
that Felt had breached its contract "ith Cassady by as-
~ip:ning its rights thereunder~ directly contrary to th~ 
proYi~ion~ of the priinary construction contract (Ex. 
Pr-~~ par. 1;)). ,, ... e do not kno"\Y ".,.hat better notice \Ve 
<'onld haY<' giYen to }.,elt that "-e "\Yere relying upon the 
a~~i.gnnH'nt as a defenst"\. It \\'"as clearly and specifically 
p1t'adPd. 
FP1t no"· con1plains that this 'vas a plea in abate-
ntent. "~hieh had to be speeiall~- pleaded. That may 
lt:tY<' hPen tru<) under the rules of con1n1on law .. pleading, 
hut it. "·a:-; not generally true under the Codes, .and it 
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1nost certainly is not true under the form of pleading 
provided by the Utah Rules. In 41 Am. Jur. at page 397, 
the rule in this regard under Code l)ractice, is stated 
as follows: 
"Some defenses may now be raised by a gen-
eral denial that under the common-law system of 
ple.ading required a plea in abatement. An objec-
tion that the plaintiff is not the real party in 
interest, or that his title to the cause of action 
is defective, if not apparent on the face of the 
record, is properly made at common law by a 
plea in abatement, whereas under the codes a 
general denial will serve the purpose." (E1nphasis 
ours.) 
The Utah Rules provide a form of notice pleading. 
All that i.s necessary is to give the adverse party notic8 
of the claim to be 1nade. V{ e submit that notice was given 
in clear and unequivocal language, by express pleading. 
If there remains any doubt in the matter, we invite at-
tention to the provisions of Rule 1, U. R. C. P., vvhich 
provides, in part, as follows: 
" (a) * * * They [the rules] shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." 
In commenting on a similar provision in the Federal 
Rules, it is said in 2 Moore's Federal Practice, pages 
56-7: 
"In cases construing the Rules courts have 
frequently reiterated the maxim of liberal con-
struction. The objective of the Rules has been 
variously phrased : ( 1) 'Decisions are to be on 
the merits and not on procedural niceties.'; ( 2) 
'to secure a disposition of litigation on the merits 
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rather than by collateral methods;' ( 3) 'to reduce 
the amount of litigation, to narrow the issues to 
avoid surprises and to promote justice'; ( 4) 'to 
achieve uniformity'; ( 5) 'to avoid a strict techni-
cal interpretation which might work a hardship 
on the litigants'; Howsoever worded, liberality 
is the canon of construction." (Emphasis ours.) 
The fact that the court did not give to this defens~ 
the full effect which we claimed for it, is certainly nothing 
about which Felt can legitimately complain. It was fully 
apprised that Hartford relied upon the assignment as 
a ground of defense, and 'vhile the Hartford contended, 
and still contends, that said assignment is a complete de-
fense to Felt'~ action, Felt cannot complain that the 
court found it was only a partial defense. 
POINT III. 
THE HARTFORD DOES NOT STAND IN CASSADY'S 
SHOES. IT IS NOT BOUND BY HIS KNOWLEDGE, NOR 
CAN HIS ACTS OR AGREEMENTS WAIVE RIGHTS OF THE 
HARTFORD, OR ESTOP IT FROM ASSERTING RIGHTS FOR 
WHICH IT CONTRACTED. IT IS ENTITLED TO STAND 
ON THE COVENANTS OF ITS BOND. 
~\ 11 of the plaintiffs have .argued in their briefs, 
Pither in ft•rentially. or directly, that Hartford stands in 
tiH· ~hoes of ca~sady, and that because Cassady did or 
ne.!.d<'~tf'd to do, cf•rtain things, Hartford is estopped 
frn111 rn i~ ing-. or has "·aiYed, defenses ";hich it 1uight 
ot Jtpr"·i ~(\ l1a Yt'. This arglunent is a fallary. The surety 
)itnitPd it~ unrlertnking to certnin tern1s and conditions 
ntnong- "·hich "·pre that Cassady u:ould be paid in ac-
('orda~lrl~ 1rith tlu' tcrn1s and pror1~sions of the pri.ntary 
c011 ,..dructiou contract, nnd that all of the obligees per-
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form their respective obligations under their respective 
contractual agreements. 
It is argued that Cassady was aware that Felt's 
only source of money was from Prudential Federal, and 
that Prudential Federal would not make funds available 
until proper contracts were signed and mortgages re-
corded. From this, it is argued that Cassady should not 
have started to build on any particular lot until it was 
sold and a mortgage recorded, and this, despite the fact 
that Cassady was obligated by the express terms of his 
contract to go forward within ten days and complete 
within six months. Felt of course, knew that Cassady 
relied upon the course of construction payments agreed 
by Felt to be paid in aceordance with the terms of the 
primary construction contract. Regardless of the effect 
which Cassady's knowledge had upon his own rights, 
(and we do not believe it had any), it could in no way 
impair the rights of the Hartford. The Hartford's bond 
specifically refers to the construction contract, and must 
be construed in light of it. Hartford was entitled to rely 
on it.s terms and provisions. There is nothing in the 
record to show that Hartford had any knowledge con-
cerning Felt's limited financial circumstances, or its 
inability to perform. Neither is there anything in the 
record to show that Hartford at any time waived the 
rights for which it contracted in its bond. Regardless 
of any knowledge which Cassady may have had, or any-
thing which Cassady may have done, such action on his 
part could not and did not affect the rights of the Hart-
ford since there is no showing in the record that the 
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Hartford had such knowledge, or that it acquiesced in, 
or consented to such acts. 
POINT IV. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT DID NOT HAVE 
THE EFFECT OF WAIVING PRIO·R BREACHES ON THE 
PART OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THE HARTFORD DID 
NOT BY SIGNING THE SUPPL.EMENTAL AGREEMENT 
WAIVE ANY BREACHES UPON THE PART OF FELT OR 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL. 
All of the plaintiffs contend or assume, that the 
supplemental agreement (Ex. Pr-3), 1nore or less wiped 
the slate clean, and that from that point forward the 
parties started afresh. In other words, all past sins were 
forgiven. This is not true. There is an adnrission in said 
agreen1ent that up to the ti1ne of its execution, Prudential 
Federal had made payments in accordance ,,ith, and 
performed its obligations under the loan agreement. 
However, the Hartford \Vas not a party to that portion 
of the agreement, did not either expressly or inferentially 
agree to it, and expressly lin1ited its concurrence in the 
.agreement to certain modifications in the pri1nary con-
struction contract. The language of I-Iartford's concur·-
rence is as follows : 
"I-IARTFORD ... \CCIDE::~T AND INDE1I-
NITY COl\{P ANY, as suretY on the bond of CAS-
SADY CO~IP .A .. NY, INC., does hereby consent to 
a1nended paragraphs ~2 and 23, and 7 of the Con-
struction contrart in connection "\Yith vrhieh its 
bond has been giYen." (Pr-6). 
Paragraph 2~ of the pri1nary construction agree-
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ment, .a.s modified by the supplemental agreement, was 
changed only in the following particulars : 
( 1) 'rhe number of houses to be built under each 
of the three different floor plans was changed slightly. 
(2) Cassady would be compensated for extras only 
if they were agreed to in writing. (Under the original 
agreement there was no provision that extras should be 
in writing.) 
(3) Extras had to be .approved by the Veterans 
Administration. 
Paragraph 23 wa.s amended to give Prudential Fed-
eral discretion as to the manner and amounts of pay-
ments to Cassady, subject, however to the following 
prOVISIOn: 
"In no event, however, shall the payments be 
less th.an those prescribed in this paragraph 23 
prior to this amendment." 
At no time was there any agreement that failure 
to make timely payments should be excused. On the con-
trary all of the contractual provisions specifically re-
quired payments according to a schedule based on course 
of co~1struction. It should also be observed, that there is 
nothing in the supplemental agreement wherein or where-
by any party thereto admits or agrees that Felt had 
performed its obligations in accordance with the primary 
con.struction contract. And Felt itself, at page 22 of its 
brief, admits that there were breaches. 
It was of course, necessary that the H.artford con-
sent to that portion of the supplemental agreement 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
wherein the time for completion by Cassady was ex-
tended. Had the consent of th.e Hartford not been ob-
tained, it would have been exonerated from liability 
under the bond under familiar principles of suretyship 
law. Likewise, it was advisable, if not absolutely neces-
sary, to obtain the I-Iartford's consent to the other modi-
fications in the primary construction contract so that 
there could be no question of its being exonerated by 
reason of changing its terms. However, the Hartford's 
concurrence in this agreement was strictly and carefully 
limited to those matters. It specifically did not .agree 
that Prudential Federal had performed all of its con-
tractual obligations, nor did it admit that any other 
patty had performed its contractual obligations, nor 
did it waive any of the rights for which it had contracted 
under the specific terms of its bond. Antecedent breaches 
were in no wise excused and there is nothing in the 
record to show that at the ti1ne of the Supplemental 
Agree1nent the Hartford had knowledge of such breaches. 
Felt has suggested that by allo\ving the cost of 
renting a po,ver generator as an offset against Felt's 
judg1nent, Felt's breach in failing to provide a power 
connection at the inception of the project is thus rectified. 
This is analogous to suggesting that a blood transfusion, 
adininistered after the death of the patient, rectifies the 
negligence of the physician in failing to giYe it at the 
ti1ne of surgery. At the beginning of the project, funds 
were sorely needed. A relatively sn1all ai11ount of n1oney 
'vould have kept the project going s1noothly. But once 
it had turned into a len1on, no .a1nount of 1noney could 
have saved it. Like a s1nall cancer, easily eradicated in 
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its initial phases, this project was neglected by the 
doctor (Felt) until the cancer metastasized throughout 
the body of the victim. By then major surgery could 
not cure the patient. Any medicine administered .at that 
late date could have only a mild pallative effect. 
POINT V. 
FELT IS BARRED FRO:M MAINTAINING ITS ACTION 
AND FROM MAINTAINING THIS APPEAL BY THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SECTION 16-9-3, U. C. A., 1'953. 
In 1neeting the contentions made under Point ,r.I 
of our original brief, Felt ignores completely the ter1ns 
and provisions of Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A. 1953. Felt seeks to 
circumvent our argument by contending that in filing 
this law suit and prosecuting this appeal, it is not en-
gaging in business in Utah. Th.at is entirely beside the 
point. When Felt entered into this promotion for the 
construction of 100 homes, it was beyond the perad-
venture of any doubt engaging in business in Utah. This 
it recognized itself and took the steps to qualify to do 
business in this state. Having done so, it was, for the 
time it remained properly qualified, entitled to all of 
the rights and privileges of any other corporation law-
fully doing business in this state. However, when Felt's 
franchise was forfeited, it forfeited whatever rights it 
had accrued up to that time. Sec. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953. 
One of those rights was the right to bring actions in 
the Utah courts. The disabilities of non-complying for-
eign corporations are specifically set forth in Sec. 16-9-3, 
U.C.A., 1953. One of those disabilities is clearly and un-
equivocally the right to sue, prosecute or maintain .any 
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action or suit in any of the courts of this state on any 
claim arising out of, or growing out of any contract, 
agreement or transaction, made or entered into in this 
state by such corporation. The language of the statute 
is clear and unequivocal. 
The cases cited by Felt, do not in the least support 
or tend to support its position. The case of George R. 
Barse Livestock Company v. The Range Valley Cattle 
Co., et al., 16 Ut. 59, 50 Pac. 630, simply holds that a 
foreign corporation not doing business in this state, 
which acquired, outside of this state, a chose en action 
against the defendant, a resident of this state, could bring 
its action in the Utah courts \Yithout qualifying as a 
foreign corporation. The case of Marchant v. l\Tational 
Reserve Co. of Arnerica, 137 Pac. (2d) 331, simpl~.,. dis-
cussed \vhat does .and does not constitute the doing of 
business in this state, and says nothing whatsoever as 
to the disabilities of noncomplying foreign corporationa, 
and particularly as to their right to use the l~tah court;:;. 
Neither case is of anY assistance \Yhatsoe\er in solYiEg 
•l (.,.. 
the problems in the case .at bar. 
POINT VI. 
HARTFORD DID NOT ADMIT IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF 
THAT PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS ENTITLED TO RE-
COVER ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER. 
In our original brief, \Ye stated that 'bthe an1ount of 
da1nages a\varded to ... Prudential Federal and Felt'' 
"\vas not an issue. ''T e 1nade the sta ten1ent silnply to ex-
plain to the eourt "~hy "Te did not detail the facts upon 
'vhieh those plaintiffs' losses \Yere clain1ed. ,.Ve certainly 
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did not intend to admit, and we are quite amazed that 
anyone would believe that we admitted, by this state-
lnent, that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages in 
so1ne amount. However, Prudential Federal has seized 
upon this statement with such vigor and has referred to 
it so 1nany time.s in its brief, that we feel it appropriate 
to clarify any doubt or ambiguity which might exist. 
WE DO NOT ADMIT THAT PRUDENTIAL FED-
ERAL OR ANY OTHER PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO RECOVER DAMAGES IN THESE CASES. We 
1nost certainly would not have appealed and prepared 
these elaborate briefs had we intended to make any such 
.admission. All we meant by the statement in our original 
brief, was that we do not desire, on this appeal, to attack 
the formula by which the court calculated the damages, 
the court having first found that the plaintiffs were en-
titled to recover damage,S. We do not necessarily admit 
that the court's formula was correct. All we say, is that 
right or not, we are not questioning it on this appeal. 
VVhat we are contending is that the plaintiffs should 
not have been awarded any damages, and that judgment 
should have been rendered in each case in favor of the 
defendant. That is what we contended below, and what. 
\Ve contend here. We trust that the foregoing will serve 
to eliminate or clarify any ambiguity which heretofore 
existed as a result of the statement made in our original 
brief. 
POINT VII. 
HARTFORD DID NO•T CLAIM THAT THE OBLIGA-
TIONS OF THE OBLIGEES WERE JOINT AND SEVERAL. 
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In order to demonstrate that its construction of the 
bond is the correct one, Prudential Federal suggests as an 
alternative construction an interpretation which it char-
acterized as absurd. We agree. This interpretation i~ 
stated on page 65 of Prudential Federal's brief to be 
H.artford's theory. This we disclaim. We have never 
contended, and we do not now contend, that the three 
obligees on the bond had joint and several obligations to 
make payments to Cassady. What we do contend, and 
what the bond plainly provides, is that in the event pay-
ments are not made to Cass.ady in accordance with th~ 
terms of the primary contract, that the surety is ex~ 
onerated from liability to each of the obligees on the 
bond. Plainly the Morningside Heights building project 
could not succeed unless everyone interested in it faith-
fully performed his obligations. Quite obviously Felt 
and Prudential Federal, and to a lesser degree, the Title 
Company, had it \vithin their po,ver to destroy the sur-
cess of the p,roject by not complying with their contractual 
agreements. Hartford certainly \vould not have under-
taken to secure perfor1nance by Cassady \vithout at the 
same time contracting for full perfor1nance by all of the 
other parties. To have done other"ise \vould have been 
little short of n1adness. In fact Hartford .agreed to ''Trite 
this bond only after a long period of negotiation. "\\Thile 
the Hartford did not require, nor did any contractual 
instrurnent require, that either Prudential Federal or the 
Title Compnn)~, guarantee payn1ent to Cassady by Felt, 
IIartford, in clear and unequivocal language, lilnited its 
liability, and stated that it \vould not he liable if pay-
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ments were not made "in reasonable compliance with th~ 
terms of" the construction contract, or if the other obli-
gees failed to perform their obligations. In light of the 
circumstances under which the parties contracted, this 
provision seems not only reasonable but indispens.able. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that the plaintiffs have 
failed to meet the arguments advanced by the Hartford 
in its original brief; that there is no merit to Felt's ap-
peal; and that the judgment of the trial court in each 
case should be reversed with directions to enter judg-
ment in f.avor of the defendant and against each of the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for H~artford Accident 
& Indemnity Company. 
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